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Abstract
This paper argues that rst passage time models are likely to better than
a¢ne hazard rate models in modelling stressed credit markets and conrms their
superior performance in explaining the behavior of Credit Default Swap rates
for the major US banking groups over the period of the nancial crisis. A¢ne
models nd it hard to deal with periods of exceptionally high or low default
risk given their assumption of a constant rate of mean reversion in the hazard
rate. In contrast, rst passage time models are specied in terms of the distance
to default rather than the hazard rate. The persistence of shocks varies with
the distance to default, allowing the default curve to invert sharply (compress)
when the distance to default is low (high). I use an empirical version of the
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) model, which contains a smoothing parameter
that allows it to control the relative e¤ect of these shocks on the short spreads
and can be interpreted as an information lag.
¤Department of Economics and Related Studies; ps35@york.ac.uk. This paper has benetted
from conversations on this subject with Karim Abadir, John Campbell, Laura Coroneo, Alex
Kostakis, Menno Middeldorp, Alistair Milne, Gulcin Ozcan, Tuomas Peltonen, Marco Realdon,
Yongcheol Shin, Jacco Thijssen and Mike Wickens. I am also grateful to participants at the 2013
Southampton Conference on the Global Financial Crisis; the 2013 European Financial Management
Association conference; the 2014 Inniti conference and two referees of this Journal for helpful
comments and suggestions.
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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis provided a stark reminder of the importance of understand-
ing and pricing bank default risk. This paper develops a non-linear econometric model
which is designed to capture both the compressed hazard rate structures seen in the
run up to the crisis and the strongly inverted structures seen during the crisis itself.
The econometric specication is used to model risk-neutral default probabilities im-
plied by the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market for six of the largest US banking
institutions since the turn of the millennium1 .
CDS and other credit spreads can be analyzed using structural models, which use
accounting information about factors such as protability and leverage to explain the
price of default risk. However, it is di¢cult to explain the pricing of default risk on
a company using accounting data if only because there are many management and
economy-wide factors that a¤ect the viability of its business and are not reected
in its accounts. Studies of industrial company spreads suggest that these data can
account for only about 60% of the variance (Huang and Huang, 2003). It is necessary
to allow for additional factors such as the e¤ect of the business cycle (Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein and Martin, 2001).
Banks are excluded from these studies since they have very high leverage ratios
and their capital and other balance sheet ratios are subject to regulatory require-
ments. Indeed, once the crisis unfolded and liquidity in banking markets evaporated,
it became very di¢cult to value many of the assets in the balance sheet. Asset value
uncertainty and the associated counterparty risk caused the interbank deposit market
to become extremely stressed over this period (Afonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2011).
In view of these di¢culties, I use a reduced form approach to model bank credit
1These have been classed as globally systemically important institutions. The CDS data for
two other important US banks, State Street and Bank of New York Mellon were too sparse to be
used in this study.
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risk. The standard reduced form model assumes that under the risk-neutral measure,
the instantaneous default or hazard rate kw follows a di¤usion similar to that followed
by the spot rate in an A¢ne Term Structure Model (ATSM).2 This provides an
exponential-a¢ne specication of the cross-section of default probabilities in terms
of the hazard rate, which is the analogue of the spot interest rate in an ATSM
(Du¢e and Singleton, 2003). The hazard rate is modeled as a latent variable that
can be estimated using a Kalman lter or simply by assuming that a particular
maturity in the cross section of default probabilities is measured without error. A
major advantage of the reduced form approach is that it allows me to employ latent
variable and other techniques developed in the term structure literature.
A¢ne hazard rate models usually provide a good empirical explanation of the
term structure of credit risk on a particular entity, one that is exible enough to t
a variety of upward sloping, inverted and hump shaped term structures. However, I
nd that the extremes exhibited by the default curves seen in the US banking sector
since the turn of the millennium cannot be replicated using this approach. These
extremes are shown in gures 1 and 2. The rst of these gures shows the 1-, 5- and
10-year senior CDS spreads, essentially the cost of insurance against default by these
six banks (in percent per annum).3 The second shows the implied term structure
of annual forward default probabilities.4 It shows that these default curves typically
exhibit a gradual upward slope, but became compressed in 2006 before inverting
sharply during the crisis.
Figure 3 illustrates the di¢culty that a¢ne models have in replicating the ex-
2Appendix A in Du¢e and Singleton (2003) shows that a¢ne models can also be obtained using
jump di¤usions and other specications of the hazard rate process.
3Strictly speaking these are the probabilities of a credit event, not just default. Besides outright
bankruptcy, the 1999 ISDA agreement dened the other credit events that trigger compensation
payments under a CDS contract: failure to pay an obligation; obligation acceleration: repudiation,
and debt restructuring.
4The annual forward default probabilities are calculated as ln(sw>w+p¡12@sw>w+p)> where sw>w+p
is the survivorship probability for maturity p = 12> 24> ===> 120 in months.
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tremes seen in December 2006 and March 2009, which bound the observations of the
sample. It shows the results for Citigroup, which was the most heavily impacted
by the Lehman default and JPMorgan which was the least severely a¤ected. While
gure 2 shows forward rates (to distinguish the default probabilities in the time series
more clearly), gure 3 shows the average default rates over di¤erent time horizons.
These default rates are the analogue of the discount rates employed in the analysis of
the Treasury bond market and are computed as the negative of the log of the prob-
ability of survival divided by maturity5 . The a¢ne models are represented by the
well-known model of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), henceforth CIR and an unre-
stricted Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model suggested by recent work on the term
structure of interest rates by Hamilton and Wu (2012). The panels on the left show
the very poor explanation provided by the a¢ne models in the case of Citigroup.
The panels on the right show that the a¢ne models provide a reasonable explanation
of the curve seen in December 2006 for JPMorgan, but underestimate the degree of
inversion seen in March 2009.
The basic problem with these models lies in their linear structure. This makes
them highly tractable but means that shocks to the hazard rate, which have a one for
one e¤ect on the short end of the default curves, always have the same proportionate
e¤ect on the longer maturities. This reects the assumption that the degree of mean
reversion is constant. To explain the low and at CDS term structure prior to the
crisis the model would need the hazard rate to be low and very persistent. Yet to
explain the steeply inverted structure seen during the crisis it would have to be high
but much less persistent. Clearly, we need to nd a non-linear model that allows the
degree of persistence to vary with the initial hazard rate in this nonlinear way.
5This calculation gives the maturity-average of the forward default rates shown in gure 2. They
are calculated as ¡ ln sw>w+p@p> where sw>w+p are the survivorship probabilities.
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This is a characteristic feature of First Passage Time (FPT) models, which specify
the risk-neutral dynamics in terms of the distance to default rather than the hazard
rate. They assume that the rms asset value follows a Geometric Brownian Motion
and that the rm defaults the rst time this reaches a default boundary. Black
and Cox (1974) showed that the default probabilities are then given by standard
FPT formulae. Consequently, if the initial asset value is close to the boundary, the
immediate default probability is very high. However, the forward default probabilities
fall back sharply with maturity in this case since the longer the rm survives, the
more likely it is that its asset value has di¤used away from the boundary. This
survivorship e¤ect causes the term structure to invert sharply. On the other hand,
if the initial distance to default is high, it is likely to remain so for some time,
compressing the default probability structure.
The basic full information version of the FPT model is very sensitive to the initial
value of the distance to default, which makes it unsuitable for modelling short credit
spreads. However, Du¢e and Lando (2001) modied the FPT model by assuming
that the investors observe the rms asset value with a lag. They showed that in this
situation, it is important to condition the default probabilities on the observation
of no prior default. They allowed the market estimate of the rms current asset
value to be informed by additional signals like credit downgrades. The risk-neutral
expectations describing security prices then involve integrals, making it very hard to
test this model empirically. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Helwege (2003) showed
that if these additional signals are not informative, this simplies the model consid-
erably. They also abstracted from the e¤ect of the tax system, using the structure of
the Black and Cox (1976) model rather than the more complex structure of Leland
(1976) that underpins the model of Du¢e and Lando (2001). They reported a closed
form expression for the conditional probability of default over any future horizon.
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I use this basic deferred ltration (DF) specication to model market percep-
tions of bank default risk during the recent crisis, developing a reduced form model
that treats the distance to default as a latent variable. This model also provides
a convenient closed form for the instantaneous hazard rate which can be compared
with that implied by an a¢ne hazard rate model. It could be tted to overnight
and other inter-bank rates. However, in view of the well documented doubts about
the liquidity of the inter-bank markets and the veracity of Libor quotes, I model US
bank credit risk using spreads from the CDS market, which were much more liquid
over this period. The use of CDS also circumvents the problem of specifying the tax
regime (Houweling and Ton Vorst, 2005) and allows me to follow Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2003) in using the structure of Black and Cox (1976). In their model, the
parameter o is added to the maturity in the default rate formulae and has the e¤ect
(like maturity) of damping the e¤ect of the distance to default on the default rate
structure.
I back out the implied risk-neutral default rates from CDS spreads and data for
non-defaultable bond prices and t them using rival econometric models, based on
the principle of risk-neutral pricing. Comparing the t of the DF model with that of
the full information FPT model of Black and Cox (a special case with no information
lag), shows that this lag parameter is of crucial importance, allowing the model to
capture the relative sensitivity of the short spreads. The performance of the DF
model is also superior to that of the a¢ne hazard rate model for ve out of the six
banks studied in this paper, the exception being JPMorgan.
Figure 4 illustrates this models non-linear hazard rate reversion e¤ects using some
of the empirical results. The central panel shows how the distance to default indicator
a¤ects the theoretical value of the default rate across the maturity range using the
parameter estimates obtained for Citigroup. With a distance to default of } = 8
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standard deviations, the (Gaussian) probability mass is well away from the default
barrier at all horizons up to 10 years, so the default risk is compressed, as it was
prior to the crisis. As the distance to default reduces to one standard deviation, the
probability of a near-term default becomes very large and the curve inverts sharply.
(The right-hand panel uses the high o value estimated for the RBS, which have the
e¤ect of attening the default curves, making them much less sensitive to maturity.)
In contrast, the left-hand panel shows that shocks in the a¢ne hazard rate model
are quite persistent, making it very di¢cult for it to t the extremes in the data for
Citigroup.
The paper is set out along the following lines. The next section describes the basic
Black and Cox (1976) model structure and the deferred ltration setting of Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2003). It also reviews the two a¢ne models. Section 3 describes the
CDS data set and empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the econometric models
and reports the empirical results. Section 5 o¤ers a conclusion and suggestions for
future research.
2 Theoretical approaches to modeling default risk
This section sets out the various theoretical models that I use to analyze default risk,
starting with the FPT model of Black and Cox (1976) and the deferred ltration
model of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003). I then give a brief review of the a¢ne model
of Cox et al. (1985), henceforth CIR.
2.1 The model of Black and Cox (1976)
Consider the structure of the model of Black and Cox (1976) (henceforth BC):
Assumption 1: All agents observe the value of the bank Y (w) at time w;
Assumption 2: The logarithm of this value y = lnY (w) follows a Brownian Motion
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under the risk-neutral measure:
gy = gw+ gz= (1)
where:  = ( ¡ );  is the expected logarithmic return common to all assets
and  the percentage cash ow return to the equity owners;
Assumption 3: The bank has perpetual debt with a face value of O. This value
is xed and cannot be used to nance coupon and dividend payments;
Assumption 4: Interest, dividends and other payments are made continuously;
Assumption 5: There are no taxes;
Assumption 6: Protective covenants or legal restrictions prevent the bank trading
with a negative net asset value. In this case, default occurs as the net asset value
rst reaches zero, or equivalently when the logarithm of the distance to default ratio
{(w) = ln(Y (w)@O) rst reaches zero;
Assumption 7: In the event of bankruptcy, the banks assets fetch the liquidation
value U(w) = Y (w)>  2 [0> 1]=
This model can be regarded as a simplied version of the model of Leland (1994),
which relaxes assumptions 4 and 5 to allow for a lower default trigger value
Y E ? O 6 and for a non-zero corporate tax rate. My empirical version of
the model uses latent variable techniques to estimate the log distance to default
{(w) = ln(Y (w)@Y E) and does not impose a particular value for Y E as a model
based on accounting information would. This model is consistent with the geometric
Brownian motion used for the rms net asset value in equity pricing models, allow-
ing comparisons of default risk and asset value across CDS, bond, money and equity
6Leland (1994) shows that this simply adjusts the trigger value whilst preserving the mathemat-
ical structure of the model.
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markets. Implied probabilities of default can be obtained from the equity market in
the full information setting using the Black-Scholes formula if we view an equity on
a leveraged rm as a call option on the rms assets with a strike price equal to the
debt ( Merton, 1974). My use of default swap spreads rather than corporate bonds
in the empirical model means that I can abstract from the tax regime, which has a
neutral e¤ect on this market (Houweling and Ton Vorst, 2005).
2.2 Default behavior
In this model the probability of default during an investment period of length q and
a starting value of { = } is the probability t of a rst passage from } to default at
zero during the period, which is given by:
t(}@> @> q) = 1¡©
·} + q
pq
¸
+ exp
·
¡2}2
¸
©
·¡} + q
pq
¸
¸ 0; q A 0= (2)
(Du¢e and Singleton, 2003), where ©[=] is the standard normal distribution function
and ![=] its density function:
!(|) = 1p
2
exp[¡|
2
2
]=
The probability of survival from time v to w = v + q given the observation {(w) = }
of the distance to default is thus :
s(}@> @> q) = ©
·} + q
pq
¸
¡ exp
·
¡2}2
¸
©
·¡} + q
pq
¸
¸ 0; q A 0= (3)
The survivorship function plays a role in the defaultable bond markets that is
similar to that played by the discount function in the non-defaultable markets. If the
short term interest rate is independent of the default probability structure as in the
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standard FPT model, then the price Ew>x at time w for a defaultable payment at time
x A w can be written as the product of non-defaultable discount bond Gw>x and the
risk-neutral expectation of the payout. If U is the rate of recovery in default and sw>x
the probability of the rm surviving from period w to x conditional upon the relevant
information set or ltration, then:
Ew>x = Gw>x[sw>x + (1¡ sw>x)U]= (4)
Inverting this relationship allows the risk-neutral survival probability to be deter-
mined as sw>x =(Ew>x@Gw>x¡U)@(1¡U). These survival probabilities are in principle
tradeable securities.7
My empirical model (see section 3) uses latent variable estimation methods that
allow the ratios }@ and @ but not the separate e¤ects of }>  and  to be identied.
Therefore the rest of this paper uses the normalization  = 1= The latent variable
} driving the cross section is interpreted as the number of standard deviations to
default. The drift parameter  plays the key role in this model, having a positive
e¤ect on the survival probabilities (Spencer, 2013).
As noted in the introduction, this model must be modied to allow it to provide
a realistic description of the short spreads. For example, discrete jump processes can
be added to the Brownian motion to make the default intensity and short spreads
signicant when the asset value is within jump-range of the boundary (Baxter, 2007).
The Levy distribution can be used to analyze default intensity in this situation and
has been used to develop structural default models. Unfortunately, solutions for these
distributions are not available in closed form and, in practice, numerical approxima-
7A position in the q¡horizon default probability can be established by buying an q-year de-
faultable bond and shorting an q¡year non defaultable bond like a Treasury with the same face
value.
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tions have to be employed, making them di¢cult to use in econometric work8 .
Finger, Finkelstein, Lardy, Pan, Ta and Tierney (2002) deal with these problems
by assuming that investors observe the balance sheet of the rm but do not know
precisely where the default barrier is. This model is extensively used by practitioners
like RiskMetrics. The default barrier is related to the observed debt by a lognormally
distributed multiplier exp[2w+2]> which has the value exp[2] at w = 0 at the outset
and increases with the time horizon w. Unfortunately this device is problematic
because it only conditions the forward default rates on balance sheet variables, not
the informative observation that there have been no previous defaults. This means
that the algebra is not valid for forward maturities w less than 2@2 (see Finger et
al., (2002) Reecting this problem, it is not possible to model the hazard rate or
short spreads using this specication.
2.3 The Deferred Filtration model
Du¢e and Lando (2001) assume instead that the rms asset value is uncertain.
They deal with these short-maturity problems by conditioning the forward default
probabilities on the observation of no prior default as well as balance sheet variables.
Their approach is thus valid for modelling the default rate at all horizons. Specically,
the investment decision is conditioned by a deferred ltration or a lagged information
set, which could reect delays in nancial reporting, for example. This lag damps
the e¤ect of accounting information on market prices and allows room for other risk
indicators to a¤ect them.
In a deferred ltration model, the time of default is not a¤ected because the bank
manager still observes the net asset value precisely. So assumption 1 is maintained for
the bank manager, who declares bankruptcy when { attains zero as in the standard
8Moreover, as Du¢e and Lando (2001) note, the hazard rate (or instantaneous default intensity)
is not well dened in these models.
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FPT model. However, investors and other outsiders observe the value of the bank
with a lag of length o= The time line is shown in gure 5. Thus we adapt assumption
1 and assume that at time w> investors get a lagged accounting signal } = y(v) where
v = w ¡ o (i.e. they have access to the deferred ltration Fv). Suppose that the
only other information that they have is that the bank has survived until w. Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2003) note that because survival from v until x A w implies survival
until w, the joint probability of survival to w and then to x = v+ o +p is simply the
probability of survival to x: s(}@> @> o+p). Using Bayes Law, it follows that the
probability of survival to x conditional upon survival to w is obtained by dividing this
by the probability s(}@> @> o) of surviving to w = v+ o given {(v) = }:
sw>w+p =
s(}@> @> o +p)
s(}@> @> o) (5)
Substituting (3) with the normalization  = 1 then gives their closed form solution:
sw>w+p = s(}> > o +p) =
©
·
}+(o+p)p
(o+p)
¸
¡ exp [¡2}] ©
·
¡}+(o+p)p
(o+p)
¸
©
h
}+op
o
i
¡ exp [¡2}] ©
h
¡}+op
o
i (6)
Taking the logarithm of this function gives the negative of the default probability
tw>w+p (since ln sw>w+p = ln(1¡tw>w+p) ' ¡tw>w+p). Changing sign and dividing by the
time horizon or maturityp then gives a model of uw>w+p = ¡ ln sw>w+p@p ' tw>w+p@p
or the average default rate over the period, which is the analogue of the discount yield
in the Treasury bond market. This is the default statistic I use my empirical models
to explain. Du¢e and Lando (2001) show that although the hazard rate is identically
zero in the standard FPT model, this is not the case in the deferred ltration model.
Equation (11) of Appendix 1 describes the forward rate function for the DFmodel.
Importantly, the information lag o adds to the forward maturity p in this formula,
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damping the e¤ect of the initial distance to default in the same way that forward
maturity does in the basic full information version of the model. This parameter
is crucially important in controlling the sensitivity of the instantaneous hazard rate
and the ultra-short spreads to the distance to default. The instantaneous hazard
rate, which I will compare with that of the a¢ne model, follows by taking the limit
of (11) as the forward maturity p goes to zero. Appendix 2 describes the likelihood
function.
This algebra can be used to represent a situation in which the default barrier
(the outstanding liabilities O in the Black-Cox framework) is also uncertain, as in
the model of Finger et al. (2002). Suppose, for example, that the default barrier
ln(Y E) as well as the asset value ln(Y ) follow a Brownian motion resembling (1) and
that at time w the investor observes an accurate but lagged value of the distance to
default {(v) = }= Then it follows that the ratio {(w) = ln(Y@Y E) representing the
distance to default also follows a model resembling (1) and that the unconditional
survivorship function is given by (3), where  and  now represent the combined drift
and volatility. The conditional survivorship function is given by (6) but unlike the
model of Finger et al., is conditioned by the observation of no prior default and valid
over the whole maturity range. Thus the model could capture the e¤ect of changes
in the resolution regime, such as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, as well as uncertainty
about the default barrier implied by the regulatory regime.
Deferred ltration models provide an interesting way of formalizing the e¤ect
of accounting and other information lags on asset prices. To estimate my model
econometrically, I assume that the information lag o is constant. Formally, this
means that in each new period the investor receives a precise observation } of the
distance to default that is one period more up to date. However, in view of the
doubts about the relevance of accounting information in this area, I adopt an eclectic
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view of the informational structure, regarding the model as a convenient nonlinear
reduced form rather than adopting a specic structural interpretation. In addition
to accounting information, the information set is likely to include information on the
state of the credit and business cycle as well as the regulatory environment. Similarly,
I regard o as a smoothing parameter which determines the relative sensitivity of the
short spreads to this information, without necessarily representing an information
lag. This gives a non-a¢ne reduced form model of the cross section of default rates
with one latent variable (}) and two xed parameters (> o) that need to be estimated.
2.4 The a¢ne hazard rate model
The standard reduced form representation models the instantaneous hazard rate kw
directly. This model provides an exponential-a¢ne specication of the default func-
tion in terms of the instantaneous hazard rate by assuming that under the risk-neutral
measure, this follows a di¤usion similar to that followed by the spot interest rate in
an exponential-a¢ne specication of the term structure of interest rates (Du¢e and
Singleton, 2003). To keep default and survivorship probabilities non-negative the
reduced form approach typically adopts the CIR square root volatility model of the
risk-neutral dynamics:
gk = ( ¡ k)gw+ 
p
kg}= (7)
This generates the familiar CIR negative exponential solution for the survivorship
function:
sw>w+p = s(kw>p;> > ) = [
2hp@2
(hp ¡ 1) + 2 ]
 exp[¡(p)kw]> (8)
where (p) = 2(hp¡ 1)@((hp¡ 1)+ 2);  =  + ;  = (()2+22)1@2;  =
2@2. This model represents the log survivorship function, and hence the default
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probabilities, as a¢ne functions of the hazard rate. Taking the logarithm of (8), using
ln sw>w+p = ln(1¡ tw>w+p) ' ¡tw>w+p and changing sign gives a linear representation
of the default probability= Dividing by the time horizon, or term, then gives a linear
model of the average default rate uw>w+p = ¡ ln sw>w+p@p ' tw>w+p@p given any time
horizon:
¡ ln sw>w+p@p=  p ln[
2hp@2
(hp ¡ 1) + 2 ]¡
(p)
p kw (9)
= d(p) + e(p)kw=
These a¢ne structures have been extensively used in modelling defaultable and
non-defaultable bond price structures. However, they are restrictive because they x
the relative e¤ect of the instantaneous hazard rate on the default rates at di¤erent
maturities independently of the hazard rate. So, for example, the relative e¤ect on
the default rates at the respective horizons p and q years given the model (9) is
xed in the ratio e(p)@e(q)= We will see this is a serious handicap when using a
single factor model to analyze bank default during the crisis.9
3 The empirical models
This section describes the CDS data set and the empirical methods employed in this
paper. The empirical results are reported in the next section.
3.1 Data
Section 2 sets out several rival econometric models that are designed to explain
market data for the cross-section of default rates: ¡ ln sw>w+p@p. These rates could,
9This restriction might be relaxed by using a multiple factor model, but empirical models of
credit risk typically use a single factor specication. Work on the term structure of interest rates
reveals that three factor models also t inverted curves relatively poorly (see for example Dai and
Singleton (2000) Table IV).
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in principle, be backed out from the prices of defaultable and non-defaultable bond
using (4). But in this paper, they are backed out of the maturity structure of CDS
prices. Since the swaps market was more active than the bond market over the period
of the crisis (being extensively used by hedge funds as a vehicle for speculation against
banks) this is the approach adopted here. Moreover, unlike bond prospectuses, those
for CDS contracts are standardized, facilitating liquidity. They are not a¤ected
by short-sale restrictions and there is evidence suggesting that they lead the bond
market in terms of price discovery (Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005, Forte and
Pena, 2009).
The CDS data were provided by Markit Ltd. They have a panel structure, con-
sisting of daily observations on ten annual maturities of US bank debt CDS spreads.10
The CDS spreads for senior debt are available back to January 2001. Subordinated
debt CDS started to trade later, though before the money market crisis of 200711 .
I use end-month observations for the 6 largest US banking groups. These comprise
three large universal banks (Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan), two invest-
ment banks (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) and Wells Fargo, a large regional
bank.
I back out the implied default probabilities tw>w+p using standard recursion for-
mulae, given by eq2.7.4) of Hull (2003). These calculations require an assumption
about the value of the recovery rate. I use the values of 40% and 20%, respectively,
suggested by the calculations in the Markit spreadsheets for senior and subordinated
debt (respectively denoted tvqw>w+p and tvew>w+p) These produce estimates for the
implicit default probabilities that align reasonably well, with no persistent di¤er-
10The Markit les also contain some observations on 6 month, 15 year and 20 year CDS spreads.
However there are a lot of missing observations for these spreads and they were not used for esti-
mation, only for ex post out of sample checks.
11The dates of these samples are reported in table 1.
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ences, as shown by the observations in gure 2.12 Table 1 shows that as in many
nancial data sets, these observations are negatively skewed and have fat tails. They
are also persistent.
Figure 1 shows the basic spread data. They show that default risk was high at the
turn of the millennium as the dot-com boom ended but then fell to a very low level
during the search for yield that preceded the crisis.13 This compression began to
unwind in 2007 after the problems with the Bear Stearns hedge funds emerged. The
inter-bank liquidity crisis then followed when problems with the Paribas hedge funds
came to light in the rst week of August. The implicit one-year default rate moved
up to around 2% for many large US banks as the money markets became stressed
(Afonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2011), with the ve-year rate moving higher in many
cases. Then, following the Lehman default in September 2008,14 the one-year rate
spiked up to 9% and 20%, respectively, for the investment banks Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley. They were hit most severely by the default, but converted to banks
in order to get support from the Fed very soon afterwards, which seems to have has
the e¤ect of calming the markets worries.
The e¤ect on the universal banking groups Citigroup and Bank of America was
more gradual and did not peak until March 2009, when their one-year default rates
reached 11% and 14%, respectively. The impact of the Lehman default on JPMorgan
and Wells Fargo was less pronounced, but all six forward default curves inverted
sharply during this crisis. Worries about the viability of Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley lingered until the end of the year but worries about the other four institutions
eased as the Feds unconventional monetary policies and the Treasurys Troubled
12Further work at the estimation stage indicated that the t of these models could not be signif-
icantly improved by adopting di¤erent assumptions about recovery rates.
13Risk premia also fell back in the Treasury bond market over this period, helping to explain the
conundrum: an episode in which long rates were stable in the face of rinsing short-term rates.
14The Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch in that month (having acquired the mortgage
lender Countrywide in August 2007).
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Assets Relief Program took e¤ect (see Krosner and Melick, 2010, Mc Andrews and
Wang,2008 and Wu, 2009). The behavior of the spread and default curves was
idiosyncratic. At one extreme, Citigroup was badly impacted by the Lehman default
while at the other, JPMorgan was less severely a¤ected.
Another high-risk episode began in the summer of 2011 as the European sovereign
debt crisis escalated, raising questions about the exposure of US banks to Europe.
These worries seem to have been more persistent than in the Lehman crisis since the
slope of the forward default curve was broadly at for most of the major banks. Yet
in the case of the Bank of America, worries about the mortgage problems emerging
over this period at its subsidiaries Countrywide and Merrill Lynch were an added
concern over this period, keeping its forward curve inverted.15
3.2 The yield factor method
These default probabilities are then used to compute the respective survivorship
probabilities and hence the default rates (uvqw>w+p = ¡ ln(1 ¡ tvqw>w+p)@p and
uvew>w+p = ¡ ln(1 ¡ tvew>w+p)@p) that are the dependent variables in the models
tested in this paper. I follow the yield factor literature (Du¢e and Kan, 1996), which
assumes that the prices and yields of some individual bonds or portfolios of bonds
are observed without error. Specically I assume that the rst principal component
of the ten rates derived from the senior CDS prices (which can be considered to
be a portfolio of senior CDS contracts) is observed without error. I rst use this
as regressor in an unrestricted OLS regression that explains the 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-
and 10-year default rates implied by the senior spreads and where available the 1-,
2-, 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year rates implied by the subordinated spreads. This gives a
15The CDS spreads for JP Morgan appear to be high over this period, but this e¤ect is exaggerated
by the scale of the chart, which reects the markets relatively low default risk assessment during
the earlier episode. Wells Fargo remained relatively immune to default risk during both episodes.
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dozen cross-sectional observations for months in the sample when both senior and
subordinated CDS data are available. As Hamilton and Wu (2012) note in the the
context of the term structure literature, this OLS model is a useful starting point
and provides a benchmark for evaluating a¢ne models such as CIR, since these are
of the same linear form but with non-linear restrictions across their coe¢cients.
To estimate the CIR model, I follow the procedure used in a principal component
based yield factor model, backing out a time series for the hazard rate kw from the
time series for the rst principal component (PC) and substituting this back into
the relationships (9) used to t the cross section. Similarly, to estimate the FPT
models I back out the log distance to default indicator }w from the time series for
the rst PC and substitute this back into the relationships (6) used to t the cross
section. Appendix 2 derives the likelihood of the various cross-section models using
this PC-based yield factor approach and outlines the estimation procedure.
4 The empirical results
This analysis began with a preliminary investigation of the data using principal
components analysis and the two linear models of the cross section (OLS and CIR).
Next, I estimated the two FPT models of the cross section (DF and BC).
4.1 A¢ne models
Table 2 shows the likelihood statistics and parameter estimates for the a¢ne models.
The rst PC for each bank typically explains 90-95% of the variance of the cross
section of its senior default rates. Reecting this, the OLS regression model also
provides a reasonable t. However, it does this by generating signicant negative
default probabilities during the pre-crisis period. The CIR models are designed to
prevent this, but badly fail a Hamilton and Wu (2102) likelihood ratio test.
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This test is based on the fact that because the CIR model is nested within the
OLS model, (twice) the di¤erence in their loglikelihood values has a "2 distribution.
However, the large number of observations in large data sets such as this strongly
biases this test towards the rejection of the restricted model. The Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) provides a better performance indicator in this situation since
it is asymptotically unbiased. The Schwarz Approximation (SCA, Appendix 1) is
based on the di¤erence between the BIC values of two nested models and also has
a "2 distribution (with 9 = 12 ¡ 3 degrees of freedom in this case). This test sta-
tistic is reported as SCA in the table. The s¡values of the statistics shown in the
table are e¤ectively zero, indicating that the CIR model is mis-specied. Moreover,
the parameters of these CIR models are problematic. The positive estimates of the
autoregressive coe¢cient  indicate that the risk-neutral dynamics are unstable and
the negative values of  reect the di¢culty the CIR model has in explaining the
period of yield compression.
4.2 FPT models
Table 3 shows the likelihood statistics and parameters for the FPT models. With
the exception of JPMorgan, the loglikelihood and BIC values for model DF are much
higher than for the two a¢ne models. Reecting this, the Vuong (1989) test statistic
(Appendix 2), which can be used to compare the performance of non-nested models,
such as the CIR and DF model, favours the latter. This statistic has a standard
normal distribution in large samples. Table 4 shows how well the DF model ts the
senior and subordinated default rates at di¤erent maturities. Clearly, this model has
problems tting the very volatile short rates, it but does well at the longer end.
The negative values of the drift parameter  shown in table 3 indicate investor
pessimism about long-term default risk. (Wells Fargo is the exception, in having a
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positive drift term.) This increases the level of default risk and gives an upward bias
to the slope of the term structure of default rates, consistent with the term structure
of the mean sample values reported in table 1. The slope is nevertheless negative
(i.e. curve inverted) when the value of } is depressed following the Lehman default.
The parameter o is highly signicant, showing that it is very important to smooth
the e¤ect of the distance to default indicator on the short maturity spreads. This is
conrmed by the very poor likelihood values shown in the lower panel of table 3 for
the Black-Cox model16 .
If we interpret this parameter strictly in terms of the deferred ltration model,
this suggests that investors price these default risks as if they observed the distance
to default with a lag of between two and four years. However, given the reduced form
nature of this literal specication this interpretation may not be appropriate. This
parameter acts as a damping factor, reecting investor uncertainty more broadly.
For example, as noted, it may reect uncertainty about the default barrier.
Figure 6 shows the estimates of the distance to default measures for the six
banks. These are highly correlated, suggesting the presence of a common risk factor
as proposed by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). The rst PC explains 94% of the
variance, although as in the case of the default rates shown in gure 2, the indicators
for the two investment banks di¤er from the rest immediately following the Lehman
default. Further linear regression tests were conducted on these estimates to check
the lag structure. Stacking the six estimates into a vector and modelling them using
rst- and second-order Vector Autoregressions (VAR) conrmed that a rst order
model was appropriate on the basis of the BIC. The o¤-diagonal elements of this
VAR response matrix were insignicant, suggesting that none of these default risk
16The SCA statistics are not reported but again e¤ectively have zero s¡values, providing a decisive
rejection of the zero lag restriction.
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indicators Granger-caused the risks to other banks. In other words, any contagion
e¤ects occurred within the monthly time frame of this analysis and the shocks were
in that sense contemporaneous.
4.3 Model comparisons
How does the non-linearity of the DF specication allow it to outperform the linear
models in explaining the default risk in stressed institutions like Citigroup? Further
analysis of the model residuals reveals that both approaches provide a good expla-
nation of the regular observations found in the centre of the distribution. These are
characterized by upward sloping curves. However, the DF model outperforms in the
extremes of the distribution. Reecting this, the a¢ne models perform tolerably well
in the case of JPMorgan, which was not as seriously stressed as the other banks.
Figure 7 contrasts the behavior of the hazard rates in the DF and CIR models over
time. The CIR model models the hazard rate like the spot rate in an a¢ne term
structure model and appendix 1 derives the hazard rate function for the DF model.
These are similar in the case of JPMorgan (as are the model residuals). For the
other institutions, the DF hazard rates tend to be more pronounced than they are in
the CIR model. The thin tails of the Gaussian distribution allow the DF model to
replicate the very low default rates seen before the crisis by increasing the distance
to default until the distribution of future values is su¢ciently far from the default
boundary.17
The central and lower panels of gure 3 show how the two approaches attempt
to explain the extreme values of the default curves that are shown for Citigroup and
JPMorgan in the top panel and discussed in the introduction. As noted there, these
17The default rate becomes negligibly small as the distance to default increases beyond six stan-
dard deviations, allowing the DF model to replicate the period of compressed default rates with
ease.
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extremes occurred in late 2006 as yields were compressed and in March 2009 following
the Lehman default. These two curves bound the observations of the sample for these
two banks. The panels on the left show that JPMorgan was relatively immune to
these developments and the a¢ne models t tolerably well in this case. However the
panels on the right show that they hit Citigroup harder, making it di¢cult for the
a¢ne models to t these periods using parameters that are largely determined by
the need to t the centre of the distribution. The linear t tends to pivot around the
seven-year time horizon, with large positive residuals at the short end in December
2006 and negative OLS residuals in March 2009.
The DF specication models these extremes relatively well. To see how it is able
to do this, the right-hand panel of gure 4 shows how the distance to default indicator
(}) a¤ects the theoretical value of the default rate across the maturity range. This
panel uses the parameter values for Citigroup shown in tables 2 and 3. With a
distance to default of } = 8 standard deviations, the risk distribution is well away
from the default barrier at all horizons up to 10 years, so the default risk is negligibly
low. As the distance reduces to } = 4, the risk begins to increase. The e¤ect is
felt across the range, not just at the longer horizons, pushing the whole curve bodily
upwards, replicating the yield curve shapes seen in the centre of the distribution.
As the distance to default reduces to two and then one standard deviation, the
probability of a near-term default becomes very large.18 However, the long-term risk
is less severe because if the institution survives the near-term crisis, the odds are
that the balance sheet will recover (the survivorship e¤ect). It allows the model to
generate the strongly inverted curve shapes seen during the Lehman crisis.
The a¢ne models nd it very hard to explain these extremes. The bold line in
the left-hand panel of gure 4 shows the intercepts d(p) in (9). These are the default
18This e¤ect would obviously be much greater in the absence of the information lag.
23
rates at k = 0> used by the model to generate the CIR estimates shown in the lower
left-hand panel of gure 3. Positive hazard rates increase the default term structure
but as noted in section 2.4, the relative impact at di¤erent horizons is xed in an
a¢ne model. The need to t the persistent hazard rate shocks that characterize the
centre of the distribution means that the compromise e¤ect e(p) is felt fairly evenly
across the term structure. But this restricts the ability of the model to explain the
inverted curve seen in March 2009. The empirical model selects a value of k = 0=17
which allows it to t the 7- and 10-year rates quite well, but seriously underestimates
the shorter rates.
5 Conclusion
This paper reports the rst attempt to take the deferred ltration variant of the
FPT model to the data. The results conrm the superiority of this model over the
standard a¢ne specication, which nds it hard to deal with periods of exceptionally
high or low default risk given its assumption of a constant rate of mean reversion
in the hazard rate. The dynamics of the FPT model are specied in terms of the
distance to default rather than the hazard rate. This means that the persistence of
shocks varies with the distance to default, allowing the default curve to invert sharply
(compress) when the distance to default is low (high). The DF version of the model
uses a smoothing parameter to control the relative e¤ect of these shocks on the short
spreads.
I have developed a reduced form variant of the DF model, which treats the dis-
tance to default as a latent variable, without specifying the precise information struc-
ture. However, the structure of the model is consistent with the view that asymmetric
information played a key role in the breakdown of the banking markets during the
recent crisis. Investors in the CDS market behaved as if they observed the distance
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to default with a lag of two to four years.
The success of this approach opens the way to a more reliable and rigorous ap-
proach to regulatory issues concerning the banking sector. For example, the barrier
uncertainty model of Finger et al. (2002) has been employed by Schweikhard and
Tsesmelidakis (2011) to estimate the value of government guarantees implicit in eq-
uity prices and ve year CDS spreads. However, unlike the deferred ltration model,
this model is not conditioned on the observation of no prior default and does not
handle near-term risk19 . As we have seen, most of the movement in the recent crisis
took place in the short spreads, which the deferred ltration model handles nicely,
allowing the whole maturity range to be used to inform estimates of the distance to
default and the value of guarantees, rather than just the ve year spread. Estimates
from the deferred ltration model could also be used to obtain fair value deposit
insurance rates (Acharya and Dreyfus, 1989) and throw light on the optimal bank
closure decision (Fries and Perraudin, 1997).
Recent US banking sector data may unduly favor the deferred ltration model,
which clearly has a comparative advantage in handling stressed credit markets. This
feature makes it likely that it will o¤er a good explanation of other stressed credit
markets such as those of the periphery of the Euro area, which experienced default
curves similar to the extremes seen in the US banking markets. It might also pro-
vide a useful structural interpretation of the data for entities that are less stressed,
comparable in terms of t to that of the standard reduced form approach. However
that remains on the agenda for future research and remains to be seen.
Given the simplicity of deferred ltration model used in this study, these results
are very encouraging. Moreover, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) suggest several exten-
19Other papers on this topic by Acharya, Anginer and Warburton (2013) for example, have
avoided these problems by using linear regression models to explain spreads in terms of equity-
based measures of bank default and other relevant regressors.
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sions that would be interesting to pursue in future empirical work. Du¢e and Lando
(2001) show that the deferred ltration approach can allow for other signals of asset
value like credit downgrades and defaults of other banks, which become potentially
relevant once there are doubts about the accuracy of accounting information. Allow-
ing for these shocks could improve the performance of the model used in this study
and provide further insights into the informational structure of the banking markets
during the recent nancial crisis.
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Appendix 1: The hazard rate in the Deferred Filtration model
The inter-bank market trades funds at very short maturities, making it important
to analyze the behavior of hazard rate (or default arrival intensity). Similarly, the
forward default intensity iw>w+p at time w and forward maturity p is the probability
of default at any instant w +p conditional on no prior default until then and the
information set available to investors at time w= Du¢e and Singleton (2003) showed
how this is related to the survivorship value sw>w¡p. Providing that this value is
di¤erentiable, then:
iw>w+p = ¡ 1sw>w+p
Csw>w+p
Cp , sw>w+p = exp[¡
Z p
0
iw>w+xgx]= (10)
To specify the forward default intensity structure for the DF model we thus di¤er-
entiate (6) with respect to p and divide by (6) to get:
kw>w+p = i(}@> @> o +p) =
³
}
(o+p)3@2
´
!
·
}+(o+p)p
(o+p)
¸
©
·
}+(o+p)p
(o+p)
¸
¡ exp [¡2}] ©
·
¡}+(o+p)p
(o+p)
¸
=
(11)
The instantaneous hazard rate at time w follows by taking the limit as p tends to
zero20 :
kw = i(}@> @> o) =
¡ }
o3@2
¢
!
h
}+op
o
i
©
h
}+op
o
i
¡ exp [¡2}] ©
h
¡}+op
o
i
=
(12)
20This formula can also be obtained from Du¢e and Landos equation (A1) using the normaliza-
tion ~{ = { and ~} = } (which specializes this to the Black-Cox model) and taking the limit in which
the variance (d2) of the additional signal goes to innity and thus becomes uninformative.
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Appendix 2: The likelihood function and the estimation pro-
cedure
This appendix sets out the form of the likelihood function and associated test statis-
tics for the models discussed in section 3 and outlines the optimization procedure.
First we use the default function to obtain an estimate of each implied value of
the default rate given the relevant model parameters and (depending on the model)
the distance to default or the hazard rate. For the FPT model we use (6) to get.
u(}w> > o +p) = ¡ ln s(}w> > o +p)@p>
(For the a¢ne model we replace this by (9) in what follows.) The senior observations
uvqw>w+p = ¡svqw>w+p@p are stacked in the vectors: rsnw = fuvqw>w+1> uvqw>w+2> uvqw>w+3>
uvqw>w+5> uvqw>w+7> uvqw>w+10g0; w = 1> ===> W= We next dene the conformable vectors of
estimates and measurement errors:
r^w = r^(}w> > o) = fu(}w> > o+1)> ===> u(}w> > o+10)g0; esnw = fhvqw>w+1> ===> hvqw>w+10g
to get the econometric relationship:
rsnw = r^(}w> > o) + esnw; w = 1> ===> W= (13)
where esnw is a vector of q=l=g. measurement and mispecication errors:
esnw » Q (0>D)
and where 0 is a 6£1 zero vector and D is a 6£6 diagonal covariance matrix. The
principal component fw is a weighted average of these rates: fw = w0rsnw> where w is
a 6£1 vector of loadings. We follow the yield factor approach and assume that fw is
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observed without measurement error:
fw = f(}w> > o) = w0r^(}w> > o)=
This allows }w to be obtained by numerical inversion:
}w = j(fw> > o) = f¡1(fw> > o)= (14)
Substituting this back into (13) gives the model:
rsnw = r^(j(fw> > o)> > o) + esnw
= f^w + esnw; w = 1> ===> W=
Thus the loglikelihood for the senior rates in period w can be written as:
Ovqw = ¡1
2
ln(jDj)¡ 1
2
(rsnw ¡ f^w)0D¡1(rsnw ¡ f^w) (15)
(neglecting the intercept 3 ln(2) for simplicity). Summing this over W periods gives
the loglikelihood for the senior rates over the full estimation period:
¡W
2
ln(jDj)¡ 1
2
WX
w=1
(rsnw ¡ f^w)0D(rsnw ¡ f^w)= (16)
Similarly, we dene a conformable vector of subordinated default rates for the shorter
period (w = Qve> ===W ) in which these are available: rsbw = fuvew>w+1> ===> uvew>w+10g0;
the loglikelihood for the subordinated rates in period w can be written as:
Ovew = ¡1
2
ln(jDj)¡ 1
2
(rsbw ¡ f^w)0D¡1(rsw ¡ f^w) (17)
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we obtain the loglikelihood for the entire cross section over the estimation period:
O(> o>D) = ¡(2W + 1¡Qve)
2
ln(jDj)¡1
2
WX
w=1
(rsnw¡f^w)0D(rsnw¡f^w)¡1
2
WX
w=Qve
(rsbw¡f^w)0D(rsbw¡f^w)=
(18)
Optimizing D (Hamilton (1994)) gives the concentrated function:
O¤(> o) = ¡2W + 1¡Qve
2
ln
Ã
1
2W + 1¡Qve
" WX
w=1
(rsbw ¡ f^w)0(rsbw ¡ f^w) +
WX
w=Qve
(rsbw ¡ f^w)0(rsbw ¡ f^w)
#!
=
(19)
This is optimized by minimizing (with respect to  and o) the double sum in the
square brackets. I do this using the FindMinimum numerical optimization package
on Matlab. Standard errors and other diagnostics are obtained using the Hessian
generated by FindMinunc. I initially used a grid of starting values but soon realized
that they always converged to the same optimum which was a unique (for each
bank). This is clear from graphs of the likelihood showing how it depends upon its
two parameters, revealing that it is essentially quadratic in nature. The likelihood
for the CIR model is similar, but uses (9) to dene f^w in (19). This is optimized with
respect to the parameters >  and .
The statistics used for testing the competing models are based on these optimized
likelihood ratios. The Vuong (1989) test framework is based on the optimized likeli-
hood for each observation ((15) plus (17)). It can be used for testing two non-nested
models such as the CIR and DF models (Vuong, 2002, section 5). This statistic
can be computed by calculating the relative loglikelihood of the two models for each
observation and regressing these values against a constant. The Vuong non-nested
test statistic is equal to the t-statistic in this regression and has a standard normal
distribution in large samples. (Strictly speaking, this should be adjusted by a multi-
plier that depends upon the sample size but this is very close to unity in these large
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samples and can be neglected here.) The test is naturally two-sided and reported in
table 3. In this application a positive value favours the CIR model and a negative
one the DF model.
Tests of nested models are more straightforward and Vuong shows that under
standard assumptions classical test statistics are valid. These are based on ratios
of optimized likelihoods (or di¤erences of loglikelihoods) for the full sample (19).
These likelihood values can be adjusted to take account of the sample size and the
number of parameters in competing models. For example, the Bayesian Information
Criterion shown in tables 2 and 3 is computed as ELF = 2OrjO ¡Q ln (W ), where
Q is the number of model parameters and W the number of observations. The
Schwarz test is based on di¤erences in these values. In table 2 for example VFD =
(ELFROV¡ELFFLU)@2 is used to test the CIR against the encompassing OLS model.
This test has a "2P distribution, withP = 10 being the di¤erence in the parameters of
the OLS and CIR models. The probability of observing these test values is e¤ectively
zero, indicating that the CIR model restrictions are not accepted by the data.
Tables
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Table 1(a) Summary statistics for CDS based default probabilities
Type: Senior Subordinated
Term: 1 2 3 5 7 10 1 2 3 5 7 10
Bank of America January 2001-July 2014 August 2001-July 2014
Mean 1.022 1.156 1.289 1.555 1.656 1.764 1.196 1.326 1.448 1.694 1.780 1.872
Std.Devn. 1.591 1.517 1.481 1.497 1.454 1.400 1.854 1.763 1.732 1.725 1.685 1.603
Skewness 2.875 2.445 2.065 1.487 1.311 1.160 2.957 2.513 2.211 1.753 1.599 1.455
Kurtosis 8.791 6.450 4.624 2.152 1.583 1.022 9.848 6.856 5.371 3.422 2.822 2.331
Auto. 0.890 0.910 0.922 0.936 0.939 0.941 0.884 0.908 0.917 0.929 0.928 0.924
ADF -3.070 -2.762 -2.389 -1.869 -1.697 -1.539 -3.170 -2.780 -2.540 -2.170 -2.020 -1.900
Citigroup January 2001-July 2014 June 2001-July 2014
Mean 1.210 1.328 1.469 1.732 1.835 1.902 1.364 1.472 1.597 1.831 1.893 1.932
Std.Devn. 2.063 1.864 1.774 1.730 1.643 1.111 2.321 2.122 2.010 1.886 1.778 1.625
Skewness 3.525 2.837 2.302 1.646 1.293 1.025 3.452 2.974 2.636 1.923 1.619 1.354
Kurtosis 15.234 10.307 7.022 3.648 1.904 0.952 14.290 11.163 9.187 5.131 3.501 2.450
Auto. 0.910 0.906 0.913 0.902 0.867 0.780 0.921 0.923 0.929 0.920 0.883 0.801
ADF -2.744 -2.613 -2.378 -1.977 -1.790 -1.673 -2.580 .2.393 -2.419 -2.110 -2.014 -1.922
JPMorgan January 2001-July 2014 September 2001-July 2014
Mean 0.587 0.719 0.855 1.133 1.257 1.403 0.692 0.803 0.920 1.159 1.253 1.363
Std.Devn. 0.594 0.582 0.602 0.669 0.678 0.677 0.638 0.645 0.652 0.705 0.698 0.685
Skewness 3.049 2.024 1.367 0.689 0.437 0.353 2.140 1.685 1.315 0.804 0.546 0.437
Kurtosis 14.509 6.859 2.931 0.030 -0.768 -0.999 7.281 4.489 2.825 0.723 -0.213 -0.580
Auto. 0.840 0.868 0.886 0.914 0.920 0.917 0.889 0.918 0.918 0.932 0.941 0.930
ADF -2.936 -2.813 -2.541 -2.128 -1.945 -1.682 -2.306 -2.399 -2.305 -2.103 -2.056 -1.872
Table 1(b) Summary statistics continued
Type: Senior Subordinated
Term: 1 2 3 5 7 10 1 2 3 5 7 10
Goldman January 2001-July 2014 March 2006-July 2014
Mean 1.264 1.384 1.504 1.737 1.849 1.968 2.172 2.059 2.232 2.483 2.539 2.598
Std.Devn. 1.632 1.517 1.460 1.401 1.335 1.245 1.489 1.516 1.446 1.322 1.246 1.170
Skewness 2.343 1.961 1.698 1.306 1.125 1.040 1.111 1.068 0.966 0.748 0.662 0.476
Kurtosis 5.781 3.754 2.515 1.119 0.673 0.491 0.230 0.272 0.084 -0.026 0.133 0.035
Auto. 0.883 0.892 0.907 0.925 0.923 0.920 0.873 0.869 0.878 0.873 0.845 0.845
ADF -2.842 -2.769 -2.590 -2.237 -2.102 -2.001 -2.518 -2.792 -2.654 -2.674 -2.776 -2.735
Morgan Stanley January 2001-July 2014 June 2004-July 2014
Mean 1.844 1.876 1.925 2.110 2.177 2.265 2.145 2.180 2.253 2.465 2.454 2.498
Std.Devn. 3.188 2.542 2.202 2.010 1.859 1.696 2.860 2.471 2.190 2.081 1.897 1.783
Skewness 4.768 3.165 2.261 1.808 1.630 1.466 2.854 2.169 1.422 1.236 1.091 0.950
Kurtosis 33.872 15.371 7.090 4.364 3.532 2.576 12.588 7.162 1.990 1.772 1.378 0.806
Auto. 0.667 0.777 0.846 0.863 0.868 0.877 0.745 0.782 0.864 0.850 0.858 0.867
ADF -2.846 -2.686 -2.499 -2.266 -2.174 -2.117 -2.520 -2.475 -2.392 -2.175 -2.168 -2.022
Wells Fargo January 2001-July 2014 October 2002-July 2014
Mean 0.573 0.669 0.775 1.018 1.112 1.231 0.725 0.825 0.912 1.129 1.211 1.305
Std.Devn. 0.833 0.778 0.760 0.805 0.768 0.729 0.979 0.985 0.897 0.916 0.873 0.845
Skewness 3.835 2.954 2.276 1.351 0.900 0.630 3.597 3.192 2.180 1.534 1.228 1.277
Kurtosis 19.184 12.451 7.757 2.715 0.767 -0.122 18.198 14.818 7.539 4.244 2.996 3.676
Auto. 0.877 0.889 0.898 0.916 0.924 0.920 0.876 0.892 0.918 0.933 0.933 0.914
ADF -2.766 -2.578 -2.366 -1.898 -1.670 -1.643 -2.414 -2.368 -2.023 -1.809 -1.757 -1.789
This table shows the basic summary statistics for the default probabilities used in this study (as % p.a.) These are backed out from senior and
subordinated debt CDS swap rates provided by Markit. The implied default probabilities tw>w+p for horizon or maturity p are obtained using
standard recursion formulae (Hull (2003)). The default rates shown in this table are calculated as ¡ ln sw>w+p@p> where sw>w+p = (1¡ tw>w+p)
are the survivorship probabilities. Mean denotes sample arithmetic mean; Std.Devn standard deviation and Auto. the rst order monthly
autocorrelation coe¢cient. Skewness & Kurtosis are standard measures of skewness (the third moment) and excess kurtosis (the fourth moment).
ADF is the Adjusted Dickey-Fuller statistic testing the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The 10% and 5% signicance levels are -2.575 and
-2.877 respectively.
Table 2: A¢ne model estimates (t-statistics in parentheses)
Model/Bank
Loglike
-lihood
BIC SCA
Param
-eters
OLS
Bank of America 9795.9 19501.2
Citigroup 9903.9 19717.0
Goldman Sachs 8027.4 15966.9
Morgan Stanley 8492.4 16895.5
JPMorgan 10995.0 21899.1
Wells Fargo 10267.0 20443.9
Cox Ingersoll Ross   
Bank of America 9691.0 19291.4 104.9 0.1002 -0.0123 0.1590
(5.77) (0.13) (45.60)
Citigroup 9727.9 19365.0 176.0 0.0290 -0.0633 0.1464
(3.78) (3.57) (47.31)
Goldman Sachs 7977.5 15867.1 49.9 0.0676 -0.0262 0.1602
(4.39) (1.03) (46.71)
Morgan Stanley 8372.1 16654.9 120.3 0.0007 -3.4201 0.1395
(0.12) (8.90) (41.44)
JPMorgan 10955.0 21819.1 40.0 0.2407 -0.0027 0.1770
(12.39) (1.63) (34.99)
Wells Fargo 10142.0 20193.9 125.0 0.1719 -0.0059 0.1933
(11.49) (2.17) (39.13)
The rst panel of this table shows the results of estimating an unrestricted OLS benchmark model and
the second the results of imposing non-linear parameter restrictions implied by the model of Cox et al
(1985) across the parameters of this model. The BIC reports the value of the Bayesian Information
Criterion SCA reports the Schwarz test statistic for nested models (appendix 2).
Table 3: First Passage Time model estimates (t-statistics in parentheses)
Model/Bank
Loglike
-lihood
BIC SCA
Vuong test:
DF versus:
Parameters
Deferred Filtration OLS CIR  o
Bank of America 9823.5 19631.9 -1.01 -4.86 -0.0810 3.4839
(73.63) (90.02)
Citigroup 10271.0 20526.9 -8.07 -10.32 -0.0300 2.2857
(25.00) (103.43)
Goldman Sachs 8028.2 16041.7 -0.04 -1.80 -0.0924 4.3668
(30.02) (78.90)
Morgan Stanley 8579.6 17144.3 -2.08 -3.61 -0.0472 2.2831
(23.51) (56.71)
JPMorgan 10864.0 21712.8 +3.86 +2.96 -0.0322 3.3660
(29=27) (133=04)
Wells Fargo 10370.0 20725.0 -2.65 -4.94 0.0305 2.4358
(21.11) (64.33)
Black-Cox

Bank of America 9380.0 18752.4 439.8 0.1254
(39.88)
Citigroup 9742.3 19477.0 524.9 0.1299
(36.51)
Goldman Sachs 7575.9 15144.5 488.6 0.1231
(41.00)
Morgan Stanley 8088.7 16170.0 487.2 0.1024
(31.01)
JPMorgan 10375.0 20742.4 485.2 0.1671
(38.98)
Wells Fargo 9913.8 19820.1 452.5 0.1976
(42.12)
The rst panel of this table reports the results for the DF model. This has a much higher likelihood
than the standard full information BC model reported in the second panel, reecting the signicance
of the accounting lag parameter o in the rst panel. Indeed, the BC model is rejected against the DF
model on the SCA test. This reveals a very signicant degree of investor scepticism about accounting
information. The Vuong (1989) non-nested test statistic is used to compare the DF model with the
CIR model of table 2. This statistic has a standard normal distribution in large samples (Appendix 2).
The positive value shown for JP Morgan favours the CIR model and the negative values for the other
banks favour the DF model.
Table 4: DF model t at di¤erent horizons
Type: Senior Subordinated
Term: 1 2 3 5 7 10 1 2 3 5 7 10
Bank of America January 2001-July 2014 August 2001-July 2014
ESE 0.7100 0.5379 0.3865 0.1875 0.0313 0.1442 0.8992 0.7208 0.5873 0.4334 0.3883 0.4033
U2 0.8009 0.8743 0.9319 0.9843 0.9995 0.9894 0.7648 0.8328 0.8850 0.9369 0.9469 0.9367
Citigroup January 2001-July 2014 September 2002-July 2014
ESE 0.6240 0.4571 0.3421 0.1614 0.0451 0.1346 0.7700 0.5678 0.4599 0.3000 0.2468 0.2847
U2 0.9085 0.9399 0.9628 0.9913 0.9992 0.9853 0.8899 0.9284 0.9476 0.9747 0.9807 0.9693
JP Morgan Chase January 2001-July 2014 September 2001-July 2014
ESE 0.4197 0.3500 0.2814 0.1546 0.0400 0.1057 0.4254 0.3739 0.3036 0.1983 0.1193 0.1294
U2 0.5007 0.6383 0.7815 0.9466 0.9965 0.9756 0.5555 0.6640 0.7832 0.9209 0.9708 0.9643
Goldman Sachs January 2001-July 2014 December 2006-July 2014
ESE 0.7717 0.5449 0.4056 0.1841 0.0495 0.1460 0.6951 0.5444 0.4612 0.2562 0.1926 0.2400
U2 0.7764 0.8710 0.9228 0.9827 0.9986 0.9862 0.7821 0.8710 0.8983 0.9624 0.9761 0.9579
Morgan Stanley January 2001-July 2014 June 2004-July 2014
ESE 1.2916 0.7624 0.5119 0.2127 0.0460 0.1994 0.8760 0.6417 0.5565 0.3730 0.2614 0.2719
U2 0.8359 0.9101 0.9460 0.9888 0.9994 0.9862 0.9062 0.9326 0.9354 0.9679 0.9810 0.9767
Wells Fargo January 2001-July 2014 October 2002-July 2014
ESE 0.3762 0.3038 0.2445 0.1190 0.0460 0.0902 0.4225 0.3957 0.3028 0.2248 0.1753 0.1950
U2 0.7960 0.8475 0.8965 0.9782 0.9964 0.9847 0.8137 0.8386 0.8860 0.9398 0.9597 0.9467
See notes to table 3. ESE denotes the equation standard error and U2 the coe¢cient of determination.
Figure 1: CDS spreads on senior debt
These CDS spread data were provided by Markit Ltd. They have a panel structure, consisting of daily
observations on ten annual maturities of US bank debt CDS spreads. This gure shows end-month
observations for one-year (red) ve-year (black) and ten-year (blue) spreads on the senior debts of three
large universal banks (Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan), two investment banks (Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley) and Wells Fargo, a large regional bank.
Figure 2: Forward default rates implied by CDS spreads
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The continuous lines in this gure show one-year (red) ve-year (black) and ten-year (blue) forward
default rates backed out from the senior spreads shown in the previous gure. The equivalent values
from the subordinated spreads (where available) are shown by broken lines. These forward rates
are calculated as ln(sw>w+p¡12@sw>w+p) where sw>w+p is the probability of the bank surviving for p
months. December 2006 sees an exceptionally compressed rate structure, especially in the case of
Citigroup. These curves then move much higher and invert by March 2009. Again, this shift was
especially pronounced in the case of Citigroup.
Figure 3: Empirical default rates
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The two charts shown in the top panel of this gure depict the cross section of the default rates for
Citigroup and JPMorgan during representative episodes. This gure shows the average default rates
over di¤erent time horizons, computed as the negative of the log of the probability of survival divided
by maturity. December 2006 shows an exceptionally compressed rate structure, especially in the case
of Citigroup. These curves then move much higher and invert by March 2009. Again, this shift was
especially pronounced in the case of Citigroup. The middle and bottom panels of the gure show the
di¢culty that two a¢ne models (CIR and OLS) have in replicating these two extremes. The panels on
the right show that JPMorgan was relatively immune to these developments and the a¢ne models t
remarkably well in this case. Those on the right show that they impacted Citigroup harder, making it
di¢cult for the a¢ne models to t these periods using parameters that are largely determined by the
need t the centre of the distribution. However, the DF model is non-linear and gives a much better
representation of these extremes. See notes to the next gure, which shows how it is able to generate
a range of di¤erent curve shapes.
Figure 4: Theoretical default rates
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The right-hand panel of this gure shows how the DF specication models the extremes of the data for
Citigroup and JPMorgan shown in the previous gure. This gure uses the parameter values shown in table
3. With a distance to default of } = 8 standard deviations, the risk distribution is well away from the
default boundary area, so the default risk is negligibly small at all horizons up to 10 years. As the distance
to default falls, the probability of a near-term default becomes very large but the survivorship e¤ect means
the longer term forward risk is much lower and the curve inverts sharply. In contrast, the a¢ne structure
of the CIR model shown in the left-hand panel means these curves all have a similar shape. They tend to
move up and down in a parallel fashion, with little more variation at the short end than at the long end.
Figure 5: The e¤ect of the deferred ltration in the model of Collin-Dufresne at al.
(2003)
Accounting lag Maturity
v ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡!l w ¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡!m x
past present future
The p¡maturity survival probability sw>x at w with the accounting lag o conditional upon no
prior default is equal to the probability sv>x of survival from v to w and then x divided by the
probability sv>w= of survival from v to w in the absence of an accounting lag: sw>x = sv>x@sv>w=
Figure 6: Estimates of the distance to default in the DF model (z, in standard
deviations)
This gure shows the estimates of the distance to default measures for the six
banks from the DF model. These are highly correlated, suggesting that a common
risk factor is at work. The rst principal component explains 94% of the variance,
although as in the case of the default rates shown in the earlier gures, the indicators
for the two investment banks di¤er from the rest following the Lehman default. The
previous gure shows the associated estimates of the hazard rates in this model and
compares these with the estimates from the CIR model.
Figure 7: The estimated hazard rates
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This gure contrasts the behavior of the hazard rates (instantaneous default intensities) in the DF
(continuous blue line) and CIR (broken black line) models over time. The CIR model models the
hazard rate like the spot rate in an a¢ne term structure model. Appendix 1 derives the hazard rate
function for the DF model. These rates are similar in the case of JPMorgan, but movements in the DF
hazard rates tend to be more pronounced for the other banks than they are in the CIR model. The
thin tails of the Gaussian distribution allow the DF model to replicate the very low default rates seen
before the crisis without di¢culty, but as noted in section 4.1, the CIR model has di¢culty handling
this.
